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ABSTRACT 
As a relatively new field of study, little empirical research has been conducted 
pertaining to computer forensics.  This lack of empirical research contributes to 
problems for practitioners and academics alike. 
For the community of practitioners, problems arise from the dilemma of 
applying scientific methods to legal matters based on anecdotal training 
methods, and the academic community is hampered by a lack of theory in this 
evolving field.  A research study utilizing a multi-method approach to identify 
and measure tasks practitioners perform during forensic data acquisitions and 
lay a foundation for academic theory development was conducted in 2006 in 
conjunction with a doctoral dissertation.   
An overview of the study’s findings is presented within this article. 
Keywords: computer forensics, digital forensics, forensic data acquisition, 
forensic protocol, grounded theory 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As a relatively new field of study, little empirical research has been conducted 
pertaining to computer forensics. (Fong et al., 2005)  This lack of empirical 
research contributes to problems for practitioners and academics alike.  For 
practitioners, forensic examiners are expected to obtain training pertaining to 
this field; however, the existing procedural instruction is largely based on 
anecdotal contributions.  Likewise, little theory has been developed by the 
academic community to aid in the development of this field. 
Practitioners have a responsibility to apply scientific methodology, as the 
courts regard practitioners that examine computer data as forensic scientists, a 
classification of expert witnesses.  (Nute, 1996) provides the following 
definition: 
Forensic Scientist - A person whose profession is applying scientific 
principles to produce information for purposes of the legal system.  
Examinations are based on the knowledge and skill of the expert when 
applying the scientific method to the tangible results, commonly termed 
evidence, produced by individuals interacting with the environment. 
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In addition to the problems presented pertaining to practitioners regarding the 
lack of empirical research, the academic community lacks theoretical tools for 
computer forensics. 
From a theoretical perspective, no known model has been established as a basis 
for researchers desiring to develop forensic protocols for other areas of 
computer forensics or even other disciplines of forensic science.  The lack of 
models to aid protocol development has been noted in academic literature, 
specifically, “The procedures and standards for developing an examination 
protocol have not been articulated, at least in forensic science literature.”(Nute, 
1996)  The establishment of such a model should be a valuable tool that will 
make a significant contribution to the advancement of forensic science. 
A doctoral dissertation was completed in 2006 utilizing a multi-method 
approach to identify and measure tasks practitioners perform during forensic 
data acquisitions and lay a foundation for academic theory development 
(Carlton, 2006a).  The initial phase of this study was based largely on 
Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to identify tasks forensic 
examiners perform during forensic data acquisitions and to identify conditions 
which lead forensic examiners to perform or omit individual tasks.  Upon 
achieving theoretical saturation in the study’s initial, inductive phase, 
additional data were collected to empirically measure the extent to which 
examiners perform the set of identified tasks.  Lastly, using a discursive 
analytic strategy, two expert review panels were interviewed to provide merit 
ratings for each of the identified tasks. 
In addition to the perceived academic value associated with this study is an 
output primarily addressed to practitioners.  A monograph titled “Forensic Data 
Acquisition Task Performance Guide – The Identification and Measurement of 
a Protocol for the Forensic Data Acquisition of Personal Computer 
Workstations – Introductory Edition” (Carlton, 2006b) presents the tasks and 
measures obtained from this study in a format designed to support expert 
testimony by forensic computer examiners. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
The research design method used in this research study was based on multiple 
methods performed in two research phases.  The first phase utilized Grounded 
Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to identify tasks forensic examiners perform 
pertaining to the data acquisition of personal computer workstations through 
the use of a series of questionnaires.   
The second phase of this study utilized review panels of experts, namely a 
panel of technical experts and a panel of legal experts, to evaluate the merit of 
each task identified in the first phase of this study.  Based on Grounded 
Theory, the conceptual model of this research design is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Research design 
 
2.1. Phase One 
Without the benefit of preexisting literature on which to pose a hypothesis, 
Grounded Theory provided an approach to collect data in a series of surveys 
that eventually led to an emergence of tasks (Glaser, 1998).  This design 
utilized a series of questionnaires distributed in an iterative approach, which 
began with open-ended questioning techniques and progressed to more 
narrowly focused questions with each iteration of the questionnaires (Dick, 
2005).  The data gathered in response to a questionnaire were used to define or 
refine categories presented in the subsequent questionnaire.  
During the first phase of this study, the membership of the High Technology 
Crime Investigation Association (HTCIA) was surveyed through a series of 
five web-based questionnaires.  The web-based instruments offered efficiency, 
and they have been shown to provide comparable results with other survey 
modes (Denscombe, 2006).  Participants were randomly selected from the full, 
international membership of the HTCIA as of December, 2005.  Selected 
members were sent e-mail invitations requesting their participation in the 
survey, access to the web-based questionnaires required user authentication, 
and controls within the website limited each authorized user to submit a single, 
complete response to the selected questionnaire. 
Phase One 
Empirical measure of tasks 
performed by forensic 
examiners 
Phase Two 
Discursive analytic strategy 
to evaluate task merit 
Output 
A collection of tasks 
identified by practitioners 
and validated by experts 
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The initial questionnaire, Questionnaire A, used open-ended questions to 
gather data from respondents without prejudice of established categories, 
conditions, or tasks, and a listing of the questions contained within it is 
presented in Appendix A (Borgatti, 2005).  Respondents were requested to 
elaborate on their responses to the open-ended questions within free-from text 
fields.  Also, the number of individuals selected for participation in 
Questionnaire A was not predetermined; instead, groups of twenty randomly 
selected HTCIA members were asked to participate in Questionnaire A, and 
the data were analyzed after each of fourteen groups of twenty members were 
collected.  The fourteen iterations of data collection for Questionnaire A were 
necessary to reach a point of theoretical saturation whereby no additional task 
categories or constraint conditions were identified (Glaser, 1992).  Overall, ten 
task categories and eight constraint conditions were identified from the data 
collected, and these categories and conditions formed the basis for the 
questions presented in Questionnaire B. 
Questionnaire B presented the categories and constraint conditions identified 
above and within each category and constraint condition, this questionnaire 
asked respondents open-ended questions to encourage directed elaboration.  
Questionnaire B was organized to identify the conditions that lead forensic 
examiners to perform more tasks, perform tasks more rigorously, perform tasks 
less rigorously, and perform fewer tasks.  Additionally, for each of these four 
conditions, Questionnaire B asked respondents to describe the tasks they add, 
perform more rigorously, perform less rigorously, or omit.  An analysis of the 
data collected from responses to Questionnaire B resulted in the development 
of Questionnaire C, and similarly, an analysis of the data collected from 
responses to Questionnaire C led to the development of Questionnaire D. 
The comprehensive analysis of data collected through the first four 
questionnaires, Questionnaire A through Questionnaire D, achieved theoretical 
saturation resulting in a set of 103 forensic data acquisition tasks and eight 
constraint conditions.  These tasks and constraint conditions are discussed in 
more detail in section 3 of this article, and a complete listing of the tasks is 
located in Appendix B – Tasks.  These 103 forensic data acquisition tasks and 
eight constraints were also presented in the final questionnaire of phase one of 
this study, Questionnaire E. 
Questionnaire E consisted of closed-ended questions to identify two primary 
aspects of forensic data acquisition task performance.  The first primary 
question measures the extent to which forensic examiners perform each task.  
For each of the 103 tasks respondents were asked to select from one of four 
choices concerning task performance.  The choices were:  (1) do not perform 
the task, (2) typically do not perform the task, but may perform it in some 
cases, (3) typically perform the task, but may omit it in some cases, and (4) 
always perform the task. 
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The second primary question measures the extent to which each of the eight 
identified constraining conditions affect forensic examiners’ performance of 
each of the 103 tasks.  To address this question, the Questionnaire D presented 
the listing of the eight constraining conditions after each task and asked 
respondents to identify each of the conditions that led them to add or omit the 
corresponding task.  The response rates all of the questionnaires are presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Questionnaire response rate 
 
Questionnaire 
Sample
Size 
Number of 
Respondents
Non-Forensic
Examiners 
Invalid E-mail 
Addresses 
Questionnaire A 280 46 14 22 
Questionnaire B 200 19 4 21 
Questionnaire C 200 25 2 20 
Questionnaire D 100 11 0 10 
Task Development 
Subtotal 780 101 20 73 
Questionnaire E 1,700 195 46 237 
Study Total 2,480 296 66 310 
 
In summary, phase one of this study began with no preexisting tasks, 
categories, or constraints.  Through a series of iterative questionnaires, 
beginning with open-ended questions and evolving into more narrowly focused 
and close-ended questions, a set of 103 tasks and eight constraining conditions 
emerged.  Lastly, performance measures were obtained for each of the 
identified tasks and conditions. 
2.2. Phase Two 
Beginning with the set of tasks identified in the first phase of this study, the 
second phase evaluated the merit of each of the 103 tasks.  Two review panels 
of experts were presented with the set of 103 tasks and asked to evaluate the 
merit of each task.  One panel of experts was instructed to analyze the technical 
merits of each task, and the second panel of experts was instructed to analyze 
the legal merits of each task.  
Both expert review panels were instructed to use the same scale when 
measuring each task.  Each expert review panel member was provided with an 
electronic spreadsheet that presented the tasks and allowed them to select one 
of five choices for each task.  Table 2 lists the choices available to the review 
panel of experts and the corresponding point value for each choice. 
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Table 2 – Review panel point ratings 
Selection Points
Absolutely Prohibited 0 
Undesired 1 
No contribution and no harm 2 
Desired 3 
Absolutely Essential 4 
 
Each review panel of experts consisted of five members.  The review panel of 
technical experts consisted of five HTCIA members that include a former 
President of the International HTCIA, the President of a local chapter of the 
HTCIA, an author of forensic application software and former officer with the 
HTCIA, an Associate Professor and Chair of the Computer and Digital 
Forensics major at a college, and a computer forensics manager with a major 
consulting firm. 
The review panel of legal experts consisted of five attorneys with extensive 
experience in computer forensic cases.  They include the Director of Office of 
Legal Counsel of a U.S. federal agency, a Managing Director for Discovery 
Services at a law firm and member of the American Bar Association’s Digital 
Evidence Project Committee in 2005, a trial lawyer and certified computer 
forensic examiner that is also the author of a monthly column on computer 
forensics, a Senior Assistant District Attorney in Brooklyn, New York, and a 
Ph.D. and J.D. that is a member of the Office of Homeland Security 
Coordinating Council. 
The results of the expert panel ratings were combined to provide three rating 
measurements for each task.  A technical merit rating represents the average 
score assigned to each task by the review panel of technical experts.  A legal 
merit rating represents the average score assigned to each task by the review 
panel of legal experts, and the overall merit rating represents the combined 
average score from both review panels of experts.  The combined average 
score is analogous to an overall grade-point average (GPA) score assigned by 
academic institutions to measure performance in different subjects, and care 
was taken to ensure equal membership size among the different review panels 
to prevent skewing. 
Overall, the methodology allowed a set of 103 tasks and eight constraining 
conditions to emerge from an empirical analysis and each task and condition 
was evaluated to determine relative performance measures and merit ratings. 
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3. FINDINGS 
A review of the findings of this study reveals interesting observations within 
the data and positive contributions of immediate and potential future value for 
practitioners and academics.  Among the interesting observations are two 
classifications of task measurements; those in agreement and those in conflict.  
As identified in section 2, different measurements were provided for each task, 
and it is interesting to note here that these different measurements were in 
conflict for some tasks.  The contrary condition also occurred for some tasks, 
as the different measurements aligned in agreement.  A collection of tasks with 
measurements in agreement and measurements in conflict is described below. 
3.1. Task measurements in agreement 
Numerous points of measurement are presented that represent the opinions of 
ten different experts and the combined performance measures from all of the 
survey respondents.  Given the large number of input sources, it is interesting 
to identify the tasks that achieved widespread agreement pertaining to task 
performance measures.  Three of the most notable tasks with high levels of 
agreement in their measurements are presented here. 
The task with the highest level of alignment in its measurements was task 
number 39, and its description is, “document the system unit’s manufacturer, 
model and serial number.”  Every member of the review panel of legal experts 
and four of the five members of technical experts indicated that this task is 
absolutely essential.  The remaining member of the review panel of technical 
experts scored this task as being desired.  Additionally, 91% of the forensic 
examiners that responded to the survey indicated that they always perform this 
task, and 3% indicated that they typically perform this task.  None of the 
respondents indicated that they do not perform this task, and only 1% indicated 
that they typically do not perform this task. 
The description for task number 20 is, “determine whether the computer 
workstation is powered on.”  This task received an expert technical merit rating 
of 3.6, an expert legal rating of 3.8, and an overall expert rating of 3.7.  Three 
members of the review panel of technical experts indicated that this task is 
absolutely essential, as did four members of the review panel of legal experts.  
The remaining members of both expert review panels indicated that this task is 
desired.  83% of the forensic examiners that responded to the survey indicated 
that they always perform this task, and an additional 8% indicated that they 
typically perform this task.  Only 2% of the forensic examiners that responded 
to this survey indicated that they do not perform this task. 
Task 75 has the description, “generate a MD5 hash value of the forensic 
image.”  Four members of the review panel of technical experts and three 
members of the review panel of legal experts indicated that this task is 
absolutely essential.  The remaining panel members of both panels indicated 
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that this task is desired.  Additionally 87% of the forensic examiners that 
responded to the survey indicated that they always perform this task, and an 
additional 2% indicated that they typically perform this task.  4% of the 
respondents indicated that they do not perform this task, and 2% indicated that 
they typically do not perform this task. 
3.2 Task Measurements in Conflict 
It is interesting to compare the measurements associated with task 75 to those 
of task 76, described as, “generate a SHA-1 hash value of the forensic image.”  
The SHA-1 hashing algorithm is arguably more reliable than the MD5 hashing 
algorithm; however, this task received significantly lower measures in each 
category.  Three members of each expert review panel indicated that this task is 
absolutely essential.  One member on each panel indicated that this task is 
desired and one member on each panel indicated that this task makes no 
contribution.  Additionally, 33% of the forensic examiners that responded to 
the survey indicated that they do not perform this task, and 27% indicated that 
they typically do not perform this task.  Another 27% indicated that they 
always perform this task, and 8% indicated that they typically perform this 
task.  The conditional performance measure of this task with the highest 
measure is the type of case, as it was identified by 15% of the respondents.  
Table 3 lists the measurements for tasks 75 and 76 for comparison. 
Table 3 – MD5 and SHA-1 task measurement comparison 
Measurement MD5 SHA-1
Overall Merit Rating 3.7 3.4 
Technical Merit Rating 3.8 3.4 
Legal Merit Rating 3.6 3.4 
Do Not Perform 4% 33% 
Typically No 2% 27% 
Typically Yes 2% 8% 
Always Perform 87% 27% 
Legal Limitations 9% 3% 
Temporal Limitations 1% 3% 
Financial Limitations 0% 1% 
Corroborating Information 4% 4% 
Technical Ability of Suspect 0% 2% 
Physical Condition of Computer 1% 3% 
Type of Case 6% 15% 
High/Low Profile 1% 2% 
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Another task that received conflicting measurements is task 28, and it has the 
following description, “if the computer workstation is powered on, determine 
the type of operating system in use prior to selecting the power off method.”  
Two members of the review panel of technical experts indicated conflicting 
opinions regarding this task, as one indicated that this task is absolutely 
essential while the other indicated that it is absolutely prohibited.  Continuing 
this controversy, two other members of this panel indicated that this task is 
undesired while the remaining member indicated that it is desired.  The review 
panel of legal experts contributed to the conflict surrounding this task, as two 
members of the legal panel indicated that this task is undesired, two members 
indicated that this task is desired, and the remaining panel member indicated 
that the task provides no contribution and no harm.  The forensic examiners 
that responded to the survey further contributed to this conflict, as 33% of them 
indicated that they do not perform this task while 35% indicated that they 
always perform it.  17% of the responding forensic examiners indicated that 
they typically perform the task while 10% indicated that they typically do not 
perform the task. 
Task 79 received conflicting opinions from expert panel members within and 
between the panels.  One member in each expert review panel indicated that 
this task, described as, “perform a visual comparison of the directory structure 
of the image and the suspect disk to verify that the image is readable,” is 
absolutely essential.  In contrast, one member of the review panel of technical 
experts indicated that this task is absolutely prohibited.  Three members of the 
review panel of legal experts and two members of the review panel of technical 
experts indicated that this task is desired while one member on each panel 
indicated that it makes no contribution or harm.  The responding forensic 
examiners were fairly balanced on this issue, as 31% indicated that they always 
perform this task and 31% indicated that they do not perform this task.  20% 
indicated that they typically do not perform this task and 13% indicated that 
they typically perform it. 
3.3 Summary of Findings 
An analysis of the data collected during the first phase of this study resulted in 
the emergence of a set of 103 forensic data acquisition tasks.  Additionally, a 
set of eight constraints were identified whereby forensic examiners may choose 
to add tasks, omit tasks, perform tasks more rigorously, or perform tasks less 
rigorously.  The data collected during the second phase of the study yielded 
three sets of merit ratings for each task, namely a technical merit rating, a legal 
merit rating, and an overall merit rating. 
In the preceding sections, three tasks with highly aligned measurements were 
discussed and three tasks with conflicting measurements were discussed.  It is 
interesting to note that the complete analysis of the study identified more than 
twice as many tasks with conflicting measurements as were identified with 
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aligning measurements.  Of particular interest are the differences between the 
indicated performance of practitioners and the opinions of experts within this 
field.  Likewise differences in opinions between expert panels and/or 
difference among experts within panels were observed in over ten percent of all 
of the tasks identified.  Forensic examiners practice their trade by delivering 
expert opinions within the legal system, and the differences in opinions 
observed in this study raise questions concerning the consistency of tasks 
performed by forensic computer examiners.  This suggests the need for 
additional research to identify potential problems and to discover solutions to 
those problems. 
This study achieved its objectives of providing a practical application for 
forensic computer examiners, demonstrating the applicability of the Grounded 
Theory Method in theory development of protocols in computer forensics and 
establishing a foundation for future research.  As a result of the successful 
identification and measurement of the forensic data acquisition tasks, the 
research model is suggested as a model for advancement by future researchers. 
4. LIMITATIONS 
Although significant practical and theoretical value may be realized from the 
results of this study, there are numerous limitations concerning potential bias in 
the data collected, output derived from a limited sample size, the scope of 
usefulness in the application of the protocol, and theoretical limitations.  These 
limitations are discussed below. 
First, this study limited its survey population to the HTCIA.  Although the 
HTCIA is the largest known international organization of forensic examiners, it 
represents only a portion of the entire population of forensic examiners.  
Furthermore, members of the HTCIA must accept the organization’s policy of 
not working for the defense in criminal cases.  This condition places bias in the 
study population that may impact the data collected. 
Additional concerns were realized from the survey of HTCIA members in the 
area of respondent bias.  Foremost is the limitation derived from generating the 
output of this study based on responses from 11.5% of those randomly 
selected.  After the survey responses were collected from the study’s website, 
an e-mail message was sent to the non-responders requesting them to provide 
reasons for not responding.  Table 4 contains a listing of the reasons non-
respondents provided for not participating in the study.  Based on self-rated 
responses, no identified differences were observed in respondents and non-
respondents regarding experience, training, or education. 
Another limitation of this study concerns the size of the expert review panels.  
The relatively small size of these panels presents an opportunity for an 
individual panel member to skew the merit ratings on any task.  Additionally, 
an individual continued to agree to participate through every follow-up contact, 
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but failed to submit his or her response worksheet prior to the deadline for 
completion of this study.  This resulted in the inclusion of an alternate panel 
member’s responses.  The alternate panel member was identified within the list 
of potential panel members provided by the Chair of the ABA’s Digital 
Forensics Project, the same list that other panel members were selected from.  
The credentials of the alternate panel member are comparable with the other 
experts. 
Table 4 – Reasons provided by non-respondents 
Description Quantity 
Responses received 160 
  Do not perform data acquisitions 56 
  Auto-reply out-of-office 33 
  Invalid e-mail addresses 17 
  Time constraints (too busy) 17 
  Vacation/travel/training 10 
  Could not find HTCIA member number 8 
  Did not trust 5 
  Spam blocker 3 
  Could not get past the survey login screen 2 
  Did not see e-mail 2 
  No longer a member of the HTCIA 1 
  Too much e-mail 1 
  Did not check e-mail within time period  1 
  Did not attempt to participate 1 
  Intended to participate and forgot 1 
 
The tasks identified within the protocol are not implied to represent a 
comprehensive set of tasks forensic examiners perform pertaining to the 
forensic data acquisition of personal computer workstations.  This set of tasks 
is limited to those that were identified by respondents of this study.  
Additionally, no conditional logic regarding the performance of tasks is 
suggested nor is the sequence of the performance of tasks. 
Regarding theoretical limitations, this study used a multi-method approach 
based on the Grounded Theory Method and based largely on constructs defined 
by (Nute, 1996).  This approach is bound by the constructs of legal and 
technical (i.e. computer science) merit.  Further refinement of this approach 
may yield a more comprehensive protocol, as described in the following 
section on future research directions. 
Lastly, although this study gathered data from international forensic examiner 
members of the HTCIA, all of the expert panel members were from the United 
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States of America.  This limitation raises two concerns, one of internal validity 
within this study, and the second pertaining to the influence of a U.S. legal 
perspective in the merit ratings. 
5. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Upon the completion of this study, numerous research questions are observed.  
First, to address some of the limitations described in the preceding section, it 
may be beneficial to repeat this study with a larger sample size and larger 
review panels; however, care must be taken regarding the use of larger panel 
sizes to ensure that the quality of expertise is not diluted.  Additionally, a more 
complete understanding of the tasks and task conditions is likely to emerge if 
these larger sample sizes and larger review panels include the perspective of 
legal defense, as well as legal prosecution. 
The author is currently considering repeating this study on an annual basis to 
provide revised versions of the protocol.  Hopefully, as practitioners recognize 
useful characteristics of this protocol and familiarity with it increases, a larger 
number of forensic examiners will participate in future studies.  Furthermore, a 
longitudinal study is also possible if a stream of annual editions of this study is 
performed. 
It would also be useful to test this methodology on other aspects of forensic 
data acquisition protocols, such as servers.  On a more generalized level, 
testing the methodology on other aspects of computer forensics protocols, such 
as analysis should also prove to be interesting. 
On interest concerning a general theory perspective, testing the methodology 
on other aspects of forensic protocol development, not computer related may 
prove interesting, as well. 
On a smaller scale, much information remains to be analyzed from the data 
collected within this study. Several interesting questions remain unanswered.  
These unanswered questions pertain to determining correlations between 
examiner status and task performance.  Finally, this study acknowledges 
numerous task measurements in agreement and task measurements in conflict, 
and it would be worthwhile to examine these further to develop a better 
understanding within this area. 
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APPENDIX A – QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Questionnaire A: 
 
1. Do you perform forensic data acquisitions? 
2. Please describe the information you request about a new computer forensic 
case before beginning work on the case. 
3. Please describe the tasks you typically perform pertaining to the forensic 
data acquisition of a personal computer workstation. 
4.. Considering forensic data acquisition cases with exactly the same technical 
configuration, are there circumstances regarding a particular case that lead 
you to perform more tasks than you typically perform? 
4A. If yes, please list the conditions that would lead you to perform more tasks 
than you typically perform. 
4B. If yes, Considering those cases where you perform more tasks than you 
typically perform, please describe the additional tasks you perform beyond 
those tasks you typically perform. 
5. Considering forensic data acquisition cases with exactly the same technical 
configuration, are there circumstances regarding a particular case that lead 
you to perform some tasks more rigorously than you typically perform? 
5A. If yes, please list the conditions that would lead you to perform tasks more 
rigorously than you typically perform. 
5B. If yes, Considering those cases where you perform  tasks more rigorously 
than you typically perform, please describe the tasks you perform more 
rigorously than those tasks you typically perform 
6. Considering forensic data acquisition cases with exactly the same technical 
configuration, are there circumstances regarding a particular case that lead 
you to perform some tasks less rigorously than you typically perform? 
6A. If yes, please list the conditions that would lead you to perform tasks less 
rigorously than you typically perform. 
6B. If yes, Considering those cases where you perform tasks less rigorously 
than you typically perform, please describe the tasks you perform less 
rigorously than those tasks you typically perform. 
7. Considering forensic data acquisition cases with exactly the same technical 
configuration, are there circumstances regarding a particular case that lead 
you to perform fewer tasks than you typically perform? 
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7A. If yes, please list the conditions that would lead you to perform fewer tasks 
than you typically perform. 
7B. If yes, Considering those cases where you perform fewer tasks than you 
typically perform, please describe the tasks you eliminate from those tasks 
you typically perform. 
8. Please describe the type of organization in which you are employed. 
9. Please describe your qualifications to perform computer forensic work. 
10. How would you rate your ability to perform compute forensic work 
compared to other computer forensic examiners? 
11. What factors do you consider to be good measures of a forensic examiner’s 
qualifications? 
 
Questionnaires B, C, and D utilized similar questioning techniques. 
 
1. Do you perform forensic data acquisitions? 
2. Considering information you request about a new computer forensic case 
prior to beginning work on the case please describe the information, if any, 
you request regarding: 
 Authorization to conduct the forensic data acquisition: 
 The location or locations involved: 
 The purpose of the investigation: 
 The issues pertaining to time: 
 The technical issues: 
 Any additional issues not listed above: 
3. Please describe the tasks you typically perform, if any, concerning the 
forensics data acquisition of a personal computer workstation pertaining… 
 To preparation: 
 To the running state (i.e., the power on/off) of the computer: 
 To the date and time: 
 To the physical examination (i.e., inspection) of the computer: 
 To documenting and/or photographing: 
 To imaging storage media: 
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 To the verification (i.e., hash) that the image was acquired successfully: 
 To the treatment of suspect media after an image is created: 
 To concluding tasks: 
 To any differences between a field acquisition and a lab acquisition: 
 Please describe any other tasks you typically perform that were not listed 
above: 
 
Questions 4, 5, 6, and 7 repeat the following suite of questions based on the 
following respective conditions:  more tasks, tasks more rigorously, tasks 
less rigorously, and fewer tasks. 
 
4. Considering forensic data acquisition cases with exactly the same 
configuration, do you perform more tasks than you typically perform … 
 If the case involves a specific purpose? 
 Based on corroborating information? 
 If the case involves legal limitaions? 
 If the case involves time limitations? 
 Based on the technical ability of the suspect? 
 Based on the type of case? 
 If the case involves a high profile situation? 
 Based on the physical condition of the computer? 
 Please describe any other conditions that lead you to perform more tasks 
than you typically perform: 
 Considering those cases where you perform more tasks than you typically 
perform, please describe the additional tasks you perform beyond those 
tasks you typically perform. 
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Task 
 
Task Description 
1 Purchase new target drives. 
2 Wipe target disk drives. 
3 Verify target disk drives are wiped. 
4 Initialize and format target disk drives. 
5 Prepare and verify toolkit – ensure equipment is fully functional. 
6 Prepare and verify toolkit – ensure that all necessary hardware 
connectors and adapters are fully stocked. 
7 Prepare and verify toolkit – ensure that all consumable items are 
fully stocked (bags, tags, forms, and log books). 
8 Add additional items to forensic toolkit based on pre-acquisition 
intelligence from requestor. 
9 Obtain latest versions, releases, or updates for forensic software 
tools. 
10 Test forensic software tools. 
11 Create a write-blocking forensic boot floppy disk and/or CD. 
12 Refer to checklist to ensure that all equipment is available prior to 
beginning the data acquisition. 
13 Receive written authorization to proceed with the case. 
14 Assign an identification code to the case. 
15 Obtain instructions from requestor concerning covert or overt data 
acquisition. 
16 Document preparation tasks in log book prior to beginning the 
data acquisition. 
17 Follow procedures identified in the acquisition checklist. 
18 View location of equipment prior to acquisition. 
19 Document all items connected to the computer workstation. 
20 Determine whether the computer workstation is powered on. 
21 If the computer workstation is powered on, then reboot it. 
22 If the computer workstation is powered on and the workstation’s 
monitor is powered on and blank, move the mouse to terminate 
the screen saver. 
23 If the computer workstation is powered on and the workstation’s 
monitor is powered on and blank, press the space bar to terminate 
the screen saver. 
24 If the computer workstation is powered on, examine it prior to 
powering it down to determine whether encryption may be in use. 
25 If the computer workstation is powered on, perform a RAM dump. 
26 If the computer workstation is powered on, collect volatile data. 
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Task Description 
27 If the computer workstation is powered on, perform a live 
acquisition. 
28 If the computer workstation is powered on, determine the type of 
operating system in use prior to selecting the power off method. 
29 If computer workstation is powered on, photograph the displayed 
image shown on the workstation’s monitor. 
30 If computer workstation is powered on, determine the programs 
currently running. 
31 If the computer workstation is powered on, power off the unit by 
using the operating system shutdown method. 
32 If the computer workstation is powered on, power off the unit by 
pulling the electrical cord from the rear of the system unit. 
33 If the computer workstation is powered on, power off the unit by 
pressing and holding the power-on button until the system unit is 
powered off. 
34 If the computer workstation is powered off, leave it off until storage 
media is removed. 
35 If the computer workstation is powered off, power it on. 
36 Determine the current date and time from a reliable source. 
37 Document the current date and time in log book. 
38 Look for any potential devices detrimental to individual or 
evidence safety. 
39 Document the system unit’s manufacturer, model and serial 
number. 
40 Photograph the system unit, including identifying information 
regarding manufacturer, model, and serial number. 
41 Photograph the inside of the system unit. 
42 Photograph all sides of the computer system. 
43 Photograph the entire area surrounding the seized computer 
systems. 
44 Sketch a diagram of the computer system with reference to its 
location and connections in log book. 
45 Document the identity of individuals present at the scene of data 
acquisition. 
46 Document the system components in the log book. 
47 Document the manufacturer, model, and serial number of all 
storage media in the log book. 
48 Document any irregularities, modifications or damage to the 
computer equipment. 
49 Remove the hard disk drive(s) from the system unit. 
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Task Description 
50 Photograph the hard disk drive(s) taken from the system unit 
including identifying information regarding manufacturer, model, 
and serial number(s). 
51 Document the pin settings of hard disk drive(s) in log book. 
52 Photograph the pin settings of hard disk(s). 
53 Remove diskettes from the system unit. 
54 Remove CDs from the system unit. 
55 Remove thumb drives from the system unit. 
56 Disconnect all USB devices from the system unit. 
57 Identify any network connections, and document findings. 
58 Identify any telephone modem connections, and document 
findings. 
59 Identify and document all peripherals attached to system unit. 
60 Identify and document all peripherals available to the system unit 
through wired or wireless network connections. 
61 Assign lab inventory numbers to each item seized and document 
in log book. 
62 Document number of hard drives, size and disk geometry. 
63 Using a write-protected method, preview contents of the suspect 
computer to determine whether an image of the suspect computer 
is necessary. 
64 Filter data based on attorney-client privilege prior to imaging. 
65 Seize external storage devices. 
66 Seize documentation, manuals, and miscellaneous notes found in 
the proximity of the suspect computer system. 
67 Connect the suspect hard disk to a hardware, write-blocking 
device, and obtain an image onto the target media using a 
forensic computer system. 
68 Ensure that the suspect computer will boot from a software, write-
blocking forensic diskette or CD, replace the hard disk in the 
system unit, and obtain an image using a network crossover cable 
method to a target disk attached to a forensic computer. 
69 Install a known disk controller card in the suspect computer, 
connect the target disk drive to the disk controller card, boot the 
suspect computer with software write-protection forensic tools, 
and create an image to the target drive using the suspect 
computer. 
70 Use EnCase to obtain an image of suspect media. 
71 Use AccessData’s FTK to obtain an image of suspect media. 
72 Use Safeback to obtain an image of suspect media. 
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73 Use SPADA 3 to obtain an image of suspect media. 
74 Use UNIX/Linux dd command to obtain an image of suspect 
media. 
75 Generate a MD5 hash value of the forensic image. 
76 Generate a SHA-1 hash value of the forensic image. 
77 Allow the forensic software used for imaging to automatically 
calculate a MD5 hash value and then verify the MD5 hash value. 
78 Perform a visual comparison using a hex editor to ensure that byte 
swapping or sector rotation did not occur during imaging. 
79 Perform a visual comparison of the directory structure of the 
image and the suspect disk to verify that the image is readable. 
80 With storage media removed, power on suspect computer system 
and document the date and time settings from BIOS. 
81 With storage media removed, power on suspect computer system 
and determine the boot sequence settings from BIOS. 
82 Media is reinstalled in suspect computer system. 
83 Suspect media is preserved in its original condition and sealed. 
84 PCs are returned to original condition and tested for functionality if 
on-site. 
85 Suspect computer system is returned to the submitting agency. 
86 Suspect media is placed in a secure storage area or evidence 
vault. 
87 Image sets are placed in a secure storage area or evidence vault. 
88 Suspect media is tagged with chain-of-custody labels. 
89 Suspect media is replaced in suspect computer system, but data 
and power cables are not attached to suspect media. 
90 A label is placed on the suspect computer system to prevent 
powering on unit. 
91 Suspect media is placed in an anti-static bag and stored inside a 
manila envelope in the lab. 
92 Suspect media is stored in an offsite, confidential storage facility. 
93 If instructed to do so, the equipment is returned as close as 
possible to the original condition after imaging is complete. 
94 Create a restore image of the suspect media onto a new disk to 
be returned to the owner. 
95 Create a clone copy of suspect media for analysis. 
96 Write handwritten reports to document all activity performed 
during the data acquisition. 
97 Print computer generated reports to document all activity 
performed during the data acquisition. 
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Task 
 
Task Description 
98 Issue a receipt for the items seized. 
99 Make sure all items are identifiable by serial number or applied 
number/tag. 
100 Archive image to DVDs. 
101 Make additional copies of images for attorneys. 
102 Request a written data destruction form to be sent to suspect if 
drive contains objectionable material. 
103 During a field acquisition, obtain signed waiver from owner 
indicating that forensic image is now the “best evidence.” 
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